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Like so many lines of business, HR departments are increasingly relying on generative artificial intelligence tools. According to Insight Globals 2025 AI in Hiring report, 92% of hiring managers say they are using AI for screening résumés or prescreening interviews and more than half (57%) are using them for skills assessments. However, even as more teams rely on AI, especially for screening early in the hiring process, the cost may be the very talent companies are seeking. A 2021 report by Harvard Business School and Accenture found that applicant tracking systems were screening out good candidates. According to the report, 88% of employers said that qualified, highly skilled candidates were vetted out of the process by their applicant tracking systems because they did not match the exact job description criteria. The percentage for middle-skills workers was even higher (94%). As candidates have a harder time finding jobs and companies still struggle to find great talent, thats a problem. I think that many companies have jumped the gun and have implemented some of these tools to help on the operations side, says Hope-Elizabeth Sonam, head of community at marketing firm We Are Rosie. But while recruiters and hiring managers have been looking for productivity improvements, they may not be taking enough time to make sure that the tools that they’re using are creating a fair, inclusive, whole, human approach to how talent is being scrutinized in the process, she says. While candidate screening tools do offer help to overwhelmed HR teams, they also need thoughtful implementationsand a few safeguardsto ensure that theyre serving up the most comprehensive list of talent available. Understand the vetting criteria Sonam says that teams must understand how their tools are vetting candidates. Many end users of these tools . . . don’t understand how the decisions are being made, she says. They don’t understand the logic that is behind this machine learning that is, let’s say, scoring their matches a 2 out of 10 fit. Ask questions about how the tools filter talent, evaluate skills, and perform other functions, she advises. Anoop Gupta, cofounder and CEO of talent sourcing platform SeekOut, advises opting for tools that use semantic match, which derives meaning from language context rather than simply searching for keywords. That way, he says, you’re not filtering out people and you’re not filtering in people who have just padded their résumé with a variety of keywords. When you understand such criteria, you can adapt your approach and data to help search for certain skills or experience. Review your training data Eric Sullano, cofounder of JumpSearch, an AI-powered recruitment platform, says that the data used to train the AI screening systems needs to be carefully reviewed and monitored. Some companies may be so focused on trying to track that magical mix of employees that have been successful at their companies, that they inadvertently train their screening systems to eliminate people who dont match those patterns, he adds. So, for example, if a company has hired a number of people from specific universities, the platform may begin to deprioritize candidates who do not match those schools. They need to be aware of the data that’s being reflected of their current organizations and their current bias, Sullano says. That way, they can be aware of areas where they may need to look more broadly at skills or unconventional candidates to find the skills they need. Audit and improve Fine-tuning screening tools to be accurate and inclusive takes time and human intervention, Sonam says. Periodic auditing of data and results is essential to ensure that the criteria and outcomes reflect the organizations best interest. It really becomes a data science and HR partnership, she says. How can [these tools] be optimized with the whole human in mind if you care about fair and inclusive hiring practices, she saysnot to mention abiding by legal and regulatory issues, as well. Sullano agrees. The best systems will provide some level of audit capabilities of what is going on with the AI, how it’s making its decisions, what context it has, he says. Humans need to review that information regularly to ensure that the right decisions are being made and, if not, that changes can be implemented to correct mistakes or eliminate overly rigorous screening that may be costing the organization good candidates. [If theres] a gray area, the hiring managers need to be able to have insight into, and a human in the loop. Feedback is going to be very important, he says. And thats an area where humans will always need to be involved, Sonam adds.
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E-Commerce
China is developing robotic guards for its Tiangong space station. Equipped with small thrusters, these AI-powered robotic beasts are being developed to intercept and physically shove suspicious objects away from its orbital outpost. It’s a deceptively simple but ingenious step towards active space defense in an increasingly militarized domain. Rather than firing directed energy weapons like lasers or projectiles, which will turn the potential invader into a cloud of deadly shrapnel flying at 21 times the speed of sound, the Chinese have thought of a very zen reed that bends in the wind kind of approach. The bots will grapple a threatening object and lightly push it out of harm’s way. Elegant space jiu-jitsu rather than brute kickboxing. The announcement, made by scientist Sun Zhibin of China’s National Space Science Centre during a recent talk at Nanjing University of Science and Technology, comes as recent Pentagon reports reveal that China has already staged the first-ever satellite combat operations in low-Earth orbit. It marks a decisive shift from passive space exploration and coexistence to active territorial control at orbital altitudes. Beijing indicates that it is not arming its space station out of aggression, but as a response to recent threats by a Starlink satellite, which grazed the Tiangong, prompting evasive maneuvers and strong formal protest in the UN by the Chinese delegation. However, it would be naive not to see it as part of the ongoing effort to dominate space by force, which is now ongoing in Russia, the United States, and China. [Photo: Getty Images] A logical design Chinas solution is actually the only possible design that makes sense. On Earth, when you destroy an aerial object, it falls to the ground, where it stays forever thanks to gravity. But firing a projectile at an object approaching a space station wouldnt end a threatit would unleash chaos. Imagine this: A bullet, no larger than your fist, streaks toward an incoming satellite. They collide not with a Hollywood explosion, but a silent, hyper-violent shattering. At orbital speeds10 times faster than a rifle roundthe impact vaporizes metal, scattering a storm of razor-edged fragments in all directions. Each shard, now a new projectile, inherits the objects original velocity. Some scream toward the void; others carve lethal arcs back toward the station, peppering its hull like cosmic shotgun pellets. This isnt just debris. Its a permanent minefield that doesnt go away. Those fragments dont slow down. They dont fall. They loop around Earth for decades, crossing orbits like invisible shrapnel. One piece tears through a solar panel, crippling a satellite. Another punches into a fuel tank, triggering a secondary explosion. The cascade begins: each new collision spawns more debris, more weapons. Low-Earth orbitonce a highway of discoverybecomes a junkyard of spinning blades, making space travel impossible for centuries to come. This doomsday scenario is what its technically known as the Kessler effect, which was formulated in 1978 by NASA scientists Donald J. Kessler and Burton G. Cour-Palais. Firing a laseror any other form of directed energy beamwouldnt stop the incoming object either (to be strictly correct, it would eventually, as light exerts a force on objects, but it would take years, so its not useful for this defense scenario). Sun’s proposal, however, would theoretically work perfectly. First, its not only about space robots. It outlines a tiered response protocol that transforms space station defense from reactive to proactive operations. When sensors and ground control detect an approaching object, the system initiates a comprehensive intent assessment phase, analyzing the intruder’s trajectory, velocity changes, and behavioral patterns to determine whether the approach represents deliberate reconnaissance, accidental drift, or potential collision threat. The assessment feeds into a decision matrix that weighs multiple response options, ranging from subtle evasive maneuvers and orbital adjustments to the deployment of what Sun describes as specialized robotic thrusterssomething Im calling space guard dogs. These bots are the most cinematic capability of the defense, involving physical interception. You can think about these space guard dogs as autonomous directional thrusters like the ones that Apollo astronauts used to maneuver the Apollo Command Module or the Lunar Module. The engineers have not presented the design for these bots yet, but they describe small thrusters equipped with sensors, a docking mechanism, and artificial intelligence. After launching from the Tiangong and intercepting the suspicious object, the bots docking mechanismmost likely a grapplewill latch onto the intruders. Once securely attached, the thrusters will fire in a controlled propulsion burn to push targets into safer trajectories, like a tugboat in a port, effectively creating a moveable exclusion zone around China’s premier space asset. Sometimes another spacecraft may deliberately come closemaybe just to take a lookbut it can still interfere with our operations, Sun explained during his presentation, acknowledging that even ostensibly peaceful approaches can disrupt critical station operations. The strategic rationale of the system is rooted in past incidents that have highlighted the vulnerabilities of orbital assets. In December 2021, China formally reported to the United Nations that its Tiangong space station was forced to perform two evasive maneuvers in the same year to avoid potential collisions with SpaceX’s Starlink satellites. Starlink-1095 and Starlink-2305 reportedly descended from their typical operational orbits of around 555 kilometers into Tiangong’s zone at approximately 382 kilometers, prompting emergency actions on July 1 and October 21, 2021. The encounters were observed by Harvard astronomer Jonathan McDowell using U.S. space tracking data, estimating that the Starlink satellite in the October incident might have come within a mere 1.8 miles of the Tiangog station. In space distances, this is the equivalent of two cars coming within fractions of an inch from a crash. The near-misses occurred while astronauts were aboard the station, endangering the life or health of astronauts according to Beijing. China stressed that states are responsible for all national space activities, including those conducted by commercial operators. The Chinese complaint to the UN highlighted the difficulty in predicting the Starlink satellites’ trajectories due to their continuous maneuvering, with their strategies largely unknown and orbital errors hard to assess, thus posing a collision risk. For the July 2021 encounter, there was no advance communication between SpaceX and the China Human Spaceflight Engineering Office (CMSEO) about the pass. SpaceX, for its part, confirmed that it checks for close approaches with both the International Space Station and China’s Space Station. The United States stated in response that these activities did not meet the threshold for established emergency collision criteria, and therefore, emergency notifications were not warranted. China disagreed, and the International Space Stationmanaged by the United States, Russia, and Europewould have probably executed the same maneuver, according to past operational history. This divergence in perspectives underscores a critical gap in international norms and communication protocols for space operations. The absence of clear, mutually agreed-upon rules for collision avoidance and maneuver notification between major spacefaring entities fosters an environment ripe for misinterpretation, accidental collisions, and escalating tensions, directly fueling the perceived need for space guard dog capabilities and contributing to a more contested space domain. This is even more important when you take into consideration how all these global powers are actively putting weapons in space and training for space war contravening the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the document that established international space law and prohibited placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit, on celestial bodies, or in outer space. [Photo: Getty Images] Advantage China Chinas protests in the UN are ironic given that Chinas ambitions in space extend far beyond its defensive robots. The country is quickly expanding military space operations, building capabilities that are reshaping the global space landscape. It founded its space force in 2024, declaring orbital operations the most crucial domain for the countrys defense. This is nothing that the United States and Russia havent been doing for decades. The Pentagon also has its own space force armfounded by Trump in his first termand has recently suggested to accelerate the countrys efforts in response to Chinas latest developments. One of the most concerning developments for the U.S. is China’s demonstrated prowess in rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), precise spacecraft maneuvers to approach and closely operate near another object satellite. These involve controlled relative motion for activities like inspection, maintenance, docking, or capture. They can be peacefullike filling the fuel tank of a satelliteor military, like taking down another spaceship. U.S. Space Force officials have likened China’s maneuvers to dogfighting in space, a term that evokes Star Wars space battles but that actually occurs in a much different way, with long trajectories that take a long time to complete and none of that Luke versus Vader tit-for-tat. Vice Chief of Space Operations Gen. Michael A. Guetlein stated in March 2025 that China has been using experimental satellites to practice these dogfights, an event that has beaten the Pentagons own plans to do the same. The test involved a series of proximity operations conducted in low-Earth orbit last year, involving five different objects in space maneuvering in and out and around each other in synchronicity, and in control. There were three Shiyan-24C experimental satellitesthink about these as the attackersand two Shijian-6 05A/B experimental space objectsthe targetswhich came within less than roughly half a mile of each other. These operations are not just technical demonstrations; they are seen as practicing tactics, techniques, and procedures to do on-orbit space operations from one satellite to another, the Space Force says, hinting at potential hostile intentions. It is not the first time China has done it, too. The Shijian (meaning “Practice” in Chinese) series of satellites has long been a focal point of concern for U.S. government and space observers due to their unannounced launches, deployment of undisclosed sub-satellites, and unusual orbital maneuvers. It has demonstrated RPO capabilities, including close inspection and even towing of other objects. The Shijian-17, launched in 2016, was equipped with a robotic arm. U.S. Space Command Commander General James H. Dickinson publicly warned in April 2021 that this robotic arm could be used in a future system for grappling other satellites, highlighting its potential for counter space capabilities. Which brings us back full circle to that idea of the space guard dogs and why Sun believes they need them. [Photo: Getty Images] The militarization of space There have been previous military operations in spacemost notably, the U.S. conducted several nuclear tests in space, like Starfish Prime in 1962, a 1.4 megaton bomb detonated at a high altitude over Johnston Atoll, an island in the Pacific Ocean, aimed t study the effects of EMP (Electromagnetic Pulse) on electronics and satellites. But things are getting really heated now. The U.S. Space Force is playing catch up with Chinese capabilities. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the U.S. Space Force’s Space Systems Command (SSC) are spearheading initiatives like the Victus Haze mission, which has already been delayed from mid-2025 to a late 2025 launch. Using only two spaceships, it aims to partially match the capabilities demonstrated by the Chinese. More importantly, however, is President Trumps Golden Dome, an ambitious $175 billion plan to build a coast-to-coast missile defense shield over the U.S. that envisions hundreds or even thousands of satellites in orbit, equipped with advanced sensors and interceptors, including space-based lasers, that are designed to detect, track, and neutralize incoming hypersonic, ballistic, and space-based weapons. Critics warn that such a system, aspiring to make the U.S. invulnerable, could be perceived by adversaries as an attempt to undermine nuclear deterrence, thereby fueling a dangerous global arms race. Indeed, China is already developing counter-stealth materials designed to evade Golden Dome’s detection capabilities. Russia has been developing orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons for years. U.S. officials have confirmed that Moscow is developing a nuclear weapon designed to target satellites, capable of producing a powerful electromagnetic pulse (EMP) upon detonation that could indiscriminately disable hundreds of government and commercial satellites in low Earth orbit. This threat is particularly concerning given the critical reliance of modern society on satellite infrastructure. The Pentagon further stated that Russia launched an anti-satellite vehicle into orbit in May 2024, placing it in the same orbit as a U.S. government satellite, and that the Kosmos-2553 spacecraft, launched in February 2022, contained components of Russia’s anti-satellite nuclear weapons system. China has clearly stated that they consider orbital space domination crucial to have military superiority on Earth. They have declared they want technological hegemony in hypersonic space weapons and so far they have achieved it, according to the Pentagon itself, which referred to its tests as close to Sputnik moment back in 2021. William Schneidera senior member of the Hudson Institute think tankwrote in 2022 that Chinas new space hypersonic force is a system of systems designed to beat the U.S.’s early warning capabilities, which detect any nuclear launches in the world. The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army doesnt try to hide its fight for orbital domination, as American Enterprise Institutes analyst Larry Wortzel highlighted as far back as 2007: In a China Military Science article, Major General Liu Jixian of the PLA Academy of Military Science paraphrases Kennedy this way: Whoever controls the universe controls our world; whoever controls space controls initiative in war. Now we are seeing the results of this vision. Of course, the U.S. thinks the same, as chief of space operations for the U.S. Space Force said in March at the Air & Space Forces Associations Warfare Conference in Aurora, Colorado: We must think of space as a warfighting domain, rather than just a collection of support activities. His thoughts are a summary of the new official Pentagon doctrine for military space operationsSpace Force Doctrine Document 1, published back in April. These developments, coupled with the deterioration of existing arms control frameworks like the New START Treatyset to expire in February 2026 with no successorand the suspension of U.S.-China arms control talksback July 2024 over US arms sales to Taiwanpaint a grim picture of a space environment increasingly devoid of guardrails. A vacuum of agreed-upon norms and limitations creates a dangerous free-for-all, where each nation’s perceived need for security drives a continuous cycle of innovation and counter-innovation, pushing towards an orbital arms race and bypassing or ignoring the Outer Space Treaty. Aside from Russias alleged new nuclear satellite, spaceships like the ones used in Victus Haze or Tiangong’s defensive robots operate within a legal gray area that exploits ambiguities in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits placing weapons of mass destruction in space, but doesnt say anything about conventional defensive systems. By framing the robots as nondestructive tugboats rather than weapons, China maintains plausible deniability while establishing operational precedents that could normalize active space defense measures. But, as we know, RPO capabilities have offensive applications too: The same robotic systems capable of pushing away threats could theoretically capture or disable hostile satellites through controlled manipulation. Sun’s acknowledgment that satellites sometimes approach deliberately to take a look reflects growing concerns about orbital espionage, where nations deploy satellites for close-range intelligence gathering against foreign space assets. The development signals that space warfare has moved beyond theoretical planning into operational reality, with the three top world powers now fielding systems capable of engaging hostile targets across the orbital domain. In this emerging environment, the line between defensive maneuvering and offensive action becomes increasingly blurred. And with it, the risk of actual space warwhich could signal the start of a nuclear war on the groundbecomes clearer by the day.
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E-Commerce
Fast Company has been covering a sea change in American business over the last 15 years or so. Companies big and small have embraced the idea that they ought to be accountable not just to shareholders but to all stakeholdersincluding workers, customers, communities, suppliers, and the planet. Some refer to it as stakeholder capitalism. Others like conscious capitalism. And for those of you who prefer woke capitalism, hey, thanks for joining us. But then, within the last year or two, it all fell apart. Even before Trump retook the presidency, CEOs had begun shuttering DEI programs and climate initiatives, and clamming up about the greater good they were pursuing. What happened? How did a megatrend that transformed boardrooms and C-suites unravel so rapidly? Thats the big question we asked James Surowiecki to dissect in this issues cover story, How Business for Good Went Bad.” Surowiecki, a veteran business journalist and author of The Wisdom of Crowds, does not disappoint. He deftly explicates a number of questions inside the big one. Perhaps the most disturbing: Was corporate Americas embrace of stakeholder capitalism ever real in the first place? In addition to those big words on the cover, Id like to call your attention to some smaller type: Summer 2025. Yes, our print magazine is now quarterly, down from five issues last year. Id like to explain the thinking behind this change, and what it means for the print magazine. Theres no point in denying the obvious: Print media aint what it used to be. I wouldnt be much of a business journalist myself if I pretended otherwise. Fast Company is susceptible to the same shifting business dynamics and consumer behavior that have forced countless publishers to cut back or eliminate their print products. And yet! We still believe deeply in print. We know that it delivers a special kind of experience for readers, one that no other medium can match. The beautiful, tactile object you are holding was reported, written, edited, and designed specifically to allow you to engage with the latest ideas of the innovation economy without the distraction and chaos of the daily news cycle. Read it on the weekend, ideally in a hammock. The coverage areas will be familiar: tech, design, marketing and branding, creativity, social impact, the future of work, and more. But unlike the up-to-the-minute news coverage youll find on fastcompany.com and our social channels, the magazine offers a view from 30,000 feet. In every article, data report, photo essay, long-form interview, and list of recognition program winners, our reporters analyze and contextualize industry trends, take readers deep inside the worlds most compelling companies, and mine the wisdom of the business leaders who are building tomorrows world today. We hope you enjoy it, and we welcome your feedback at editor@fastcompany.com. Mnuka Slab was designed in 2021 by Kris Sowersby for Klim Type Foundry A playful punch For this issues headline typeface, we chose Mnuka Slab. Its tall, condensed proportions are like a typographic punch in the guts, says designer Kris Sowersby, making it perfect for an issue that explores how stakeholder capitalism got the wind knocked out of it. Mnuka is inspired by 19th-century wood type, evoking posters that promoted the circus and civil protest. But it has a lighter side: Check out the pigtail of the uppercase Q and the ball terminal of the Jfitting for the issues tribute to Sharpie markers. And like Sharpies, condensed typefaces never go out of style. Mike Schnaidt, creative director
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E-Commerce
President Donald Trumps idea of a Golden Dome missile defense system carries a range of potential strategic dangers for the United States. Golden Dome is meant to protect the U.S. from ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles, and missiles launched from space. Trump has called for the missile defense to be fully operational before the end of his term in three years. Trumps goals for Golden Dome are likely beyond reach. A wide range of studies makes clear that even defenses far more limited than what Trump envisions would be far more expensive and less effective than Trump expects, especially against enemy missiles equipped with modern countermeasures. Countermeasures include multiple warheads per missile, decoy warheads, and warheads that can maneuver or are difficult to track, among others. Regardless of Golden Domes feasibility, there is a long history of scholarship about strategic missile defenses, and the weight of evidence points to the defenses making their host country less safe from nuclear attack. Im a national security and foreign policy professor at Harvard University, where I lead Managing the Atom, the universitys main research group on nuclear weapons and nuclear energy policies. For decades, Ive been participating in dialogues with Russian and Chinese nuclear expertsand their fears about U.S. missile defenses have been a consistent theme throughout. Russian President Vladmir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping have already warned that Golden Dome is destabilizing. Along with U.S. offensive capabilities, Golden Dome poses a threat of directly undermining global strategic stability, spurring an arms race, and increasing conflict potential both among nuclear-weapon states and in the international arena as a whole, a joint statement from China and Russia said. While that is a propaganda statement, it reflects real concerns broadly held in both countries. History lessons Experience going back half a century makes clear that if the administration pursues Golden Dome, it is likely to provoke even larger arms buildups, derail already-dim prospects for any negotiated nuclear arms restraint, and perhaps even increase the chances of nuclear war. My first book, 35 years ago, made the case that it would be in the U.S. national security interest to remain within the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which strictly limited U.S. and Sovietand later Russianmissile defenses. The U.S. and the Soviet Union negotiated the ABM Treaty as part of SALT I, the first agreements limiting the nuclear arms race. It was approved in the Senate 98-2. The ABM Treaty experience is instructive for the implications of Golden Dome today. Why did the two countries agree to limit defenses? First and foremost, because they understood that unless each sides defenses were limited, they would not be able to stop an offensive nuclear arms race. If each side wants to maintain the ability to retaliate if the other attacks (Dont nuke me, or Ill nuke you), then an obvious answer to one side building up more defenses is for the other to build up more nuclear warheads. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets installed 100 interceptors to defend Moscow, so the U.S. targeted still more warheads on Moscow to overwhelm the defense. Had it ever come to a nuclear war, Moscow would have been even more thoroughly obliterated than if there had been no defense at all. Both sides came to realize that unlimited missile defenses would just mean more offense on both sides, leaving both less secure than before. In addition, nations viewed an adversarys shield as going hand in hand with a nuclear sword. A nuclear first strike might destroy a major part of a countrys nuclear forces. Missile defenses would inevitably be more effective against the reduced, disorganized retaliation that they knew would be coming than they would be against a massive, well-planned surprise attack. That potential advantage to whoever struck first could make nuclear crises even more dangerous. Post-ABM Treaty world Unfortunately, President George W. Bush pulled the United States out of the ABM Treaty in 2002, seeking to free U.S. development of defenses against potential missile attacks from small states such as North Korea. But even now, decades later, the U.S. has fewer missile interceptors deployed (44) than the treaty permitted (100). The U.S. pullout did not lead to an immediate arms buildup or the end of nuclear arms control. But Putin has complained bitterly about U.S. missile defenses and the U.S. refusal to accept any limitation at all on them. He views the U.S. stance as an effort to achieve military superiority by negating Russias nuclear deterrent. Russia is investing heavily in new types of strategic nuclear weapons intended to avoid U.S. missile defenses, from an intercontinental nuclear torpedo to a missile that can go around the world and attack from the south, while U.S. defenses are mainly pointed north toward Russia. Similarly, much of Chinas nuclear buildup appears to be driven by wanting a reliable nuclear deterrent in the face of the U.S.s capability to strike its nuclear forces and use missile defenses to mop up the remainder. Indeed, the Chinese were so angered by South Koreas deployment of U.S.-provided regional defenseswhich they saw as aiding the U.S. ability to intercept Chinese missilesthat they imposed stiff sanctions on South Korea. Fuel to the fire Now Trump wants to go much further, with a defense forever ending the missile threat to the American homeland, with a success rate very close to 100%. I believe that this effort is highly likely to lead to still larger nuclear buildups in Rusia and China. The Putin-Xi joint statement pledges to counter defenses aimed at achieving military superiority. Given the ease of developing countermeasures that are extraordinarily difficult for defenses to overcome, odds are the resulting offense-defense competition will leave the U.S. worse off than before, and a good bit poorer. Putin and Xi made clear that they are particularly concerned about the thousands of space-based interceptors Trump envisions. These interceptors are designed to hit missiles while their rockets are still burning during launch. Most countries are likely to oppose the idea of deploying huge numbers of weapons in space, and these interceptors would be both expensive and vulnerable. China and Russia could focus on further developing anti-satellite weapons to blow a hole in the defense, increasing the risk of space war. Already, there is a real danger that the whole effort of negotiated limits to temper nuclear arms racing may be coming to an end. The last remaining treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, the New START Treaty, expires in February 2026. Chinas rapid nuclear buildup is making many defense officials and experts in Washington, D.C., call for a U.S. buildup in response. Intense hostility all around means that for now, neither Russia nor China is even willing to sit down to discuss nuclear restraints, in treaty form or otherwise. A way forward In my view, adding Golden Dome to this combustible mix would likely end any prospect of avoiding a future of unrestrained and unpredictable nuclear arms competition. But paths away from these dangers are available. It would be quite plausible to design defenses that would provide some protection against attacks from a handful of missiles from North Korea or others that would not seriously threaten Russian or Chinese deterrent forcesand design restraints that would allow all parties to plan their offensive forces knowing what missile defenses they would be facing in the years to come. I believe that Trump should temper his Golden Dome ambitions to achieve his other dream of negotiating a deal to reduce nuclear dangers. Matthew Bunn is a professor of the practice of energy, national security, and foreign policy at Harvard Kennedy School. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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E-Commerce
Every year, massive data breaches harm the public. The targets are email service providers, retailers and government agencies that store information about people. Each breach includes sensitive personal information such as credit and debit card numbers, home addresses, and account usernames and passwords from hundreds of thousandsand sometimes millionsof people. When National Public Data, a company that does online background checks, was breached in 2024, criminals gained the names, addresses, dates of birth, and national identification numbers such as Social Security numbers of 170 million people in the U.S., U.K., and Canada. The same year, hackers who targeted Ticketmaster stole the financial information and personal data of more than 560 million customers. As a criminologist who researches cybercrime, I study the ways that hackers and cybercriminals steal and use peoples personal information. Understanding the people involved helps us to better recognize the ways that hacking and data breaches are intertwined. In so-called stolen data markets, hackers sell personal information they illegally obtain to others, who then use the data to engage in fraud and theft for profit. The quantity problem Every piece of personal data captured in a data breacha passport number, Social Security number, or login for a shopping servicehas inherent value. Offenders can use the information in different ways. They can assume someone elses identity, make a fraudulent purchase, or steal services such as streaming media or music. The quantity of information, whether Social Security numbers or credit card details, that can be stolen through data breaches is more than any one group of criminals can efficiently process, validate, or use in a reasonable amount of time. The same is true for the millions of email account usernames and passwords, or access to streaming services that data breaches can expose. This quantity problem has enabled the sale of information, including personal financial data, as part of the larger cybercrime online economy. !function(){"use strict";window.addEventListener("message",(function(a){if(void 0!==a.data["datawrapper-height"]){var e=document.querySelectorAll("iframe");for(var t in a.data["datawrapper-height"])for(var r,i=0;r=e[i];i++)if(r.contentWindow===a.source){var d=a.data["datawrapper-height"][t]+"px";r.style.height=d}}}))}(); The sale of data, also known as carding, references the misuse of stolen credit card numbers or identity details. These illicit data markets began in the mid-1990s through the use of credit card number generators used by hackers. They shared programs that randomly generated credit card numbers and details and then checked to see whether the fake account details matched active cards that could then be used for fraudulent transactions. As more financial services were created and banks allowed customers to access their accounts through the internet, it became easier for hackers and cybercriminals to steal personal information through data breaches and phishing. Phishing involves sending convincing emails or SMS text messages to people to trick them into giving up sensitive information such as logins and passwords, often by clicking a false link that seems legitimate. One of the first phishing schemes targeted America Online users to get their account information to use their internet service at no charge. Selling stolen data online The large amount of information criminals were able to steal from such schemes led to more vendors offering stolen data to others through different online platforms. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, offenders used Internet Relay Chat, or IRC channels, to sell data. IRC was effectively like modern instant messaging systems, letting people communicate in real time through specialized software. Criminals used these channels to sell data and hacking services in an efficient place. In the early 2000s, vendors transitioned to web forums where individuals advertised their services to other users. Forums quickly gained popularity and became successful businesses with vendors selling stolen credit cards, malware, and related goods and services to misuse personal information and enable fraud. One of the more prominent forums from this time was ShadowCrew, which formed in 2002 and operated until being taken down by a joint law enforcement operation in 2004. Their members trafficked more than 1.7 million credit cards in less than three years. Forums continue to be popular, though vendors transitioned to running their own web-based shops on the open internet and dark web, which is an encrypted portion of the web that can be accessed only through specialized browsers like TOR, starting in the early 2010s. These shops have their own web addresses and distinct branding to attract customers, and they work in the same way as other e-commerce stores. More recently, vendors of stolen data have also begun to operate on messaging platforms such as Telegram and Signal to quickly connect with customers. Cybercriminals and customers Many of the people who supply and operate the markets appear to be cybercriminals from Eastern Europe and Russia who steal data and then sell it to others. Markets have also been observed in Vietnam and other parts of the world, though they do nt get the same visibility in the global cybersecurity landscape. The customers of stolen data markets may reside anywhere in the world, and their demands for specific data or services may drive data breaches and cybercrime to provide the supply. The goods Stolen data is usually available in individual lots, such as a persons credit or debit card and all the information associated with the account. These pieces are individually priced, with costs differing depending on the type of card, the victims location and the amount of data available related to the affected account. Vendors frequently offer discounts and promotions to buyers to attract customers and keep them loyal. This is often done with credit or debit cards that are about to expire. Some vendors also offer distinct products such as credit reports, Social Security numbers and login details for different paid services. The price for pieces of information varies. A recent analysis found credit card data sold for $50 on average, while Walmart logins sold for $9. However, the pricing can vary widely across vendors and markets. Illicit payments Vendors typically accept payment through cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin that are difficult for law enforcement to trace. Once payment is received, the vendor releases the data to the customer. Customers take on a great deal of the risk in this market because they cannot go to the police or a market regulator to complain about a fraudulent sale. Vendors may send customers dead accounts that are unable to be used or give no data at all. Such scams are common in a market where buyers can depend only on signals of vendor trust to increase the odds that the data they purchase will be delivered, and if it is, that it pays off. If the data they buy is functional, they can use it to make fraudulent purchases or financial transactions for profit. The rate of return can be exceptional. An offender who buys 100 cards for $500 can recoup costs if only 20 of those cards are active and can be used to make an average purchase of $30. The result is that data breaches are likely to continue as long as there is demand for illicit, profitable data. This article is part of a series on data privacy that explores who collects your data, what and how they collect, who sells and buys your data, what they all do with it, and what you can do about it. Thomas Holt is a professor of criminal justice at Michigan State University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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E-Commerce
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